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Daylight savings: What an answer to the
perceptual variation problem cannot be∗
Eliot Michaelson†and Jonathan Cohen‡
WHEREAS, as the “Sunshine State,” Florida should be kept
sunny year-round, NOW, THEREFORE, Be It Enacted by the
Legislature of the State of Florida: . . .
(2) If the United States Congress amends 15 U.S.C. §260a to
authorize states to observe daylight saving time year-round, it
is the intent of the Legislature that daylight saving time shall be
the year-round standard time of the entire state and all of its
political subdivisions.
— Florida HB 1013 (2018)
Abstract
Significant variations in the way objects appear across different view-
ing conditions pose a challenge to the view that they have some true,
determinate color. This view would seem to require that we break the
symmetry between multiple appearances in favor of a single variant. A
wide range of philosophical and non-philosophical writers have held that
the symmetry can be broken by appealing to daylight viewing conditions—
that the appearances of objects in daylight have a stronger, and perhaps
unique, claim to reveal their true colors. In this note we argue that,
whatever else its merits, this appeal to daylight is not a satisfactory answer
to the problem posed by perceptual variation.
Your friend just gave you a wonderful new coffee cup. Chuffed as you
are with your gift, you watch the cup throughout the day, and notice that
it varies significantly in respect of how it looks as a function of the varying
illumination. In your office, the cup looks blue; in the hallway, it looks silver;
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in the department lounge, it takes on a tinge of green. Just what color is your
new cup?
Such cases of changes in the looks of things (in respect of their colors) are
ubiquitous in ecologically realistic settings, and have been common fodder in
philosophical disputes about the nature of color since the pre-Socratics, through
the Great Moderns, and up to the present (see, for example, Burnyeat 1979;
Hardin 1988; Matthen 1999; Cohen 2009).1 We can construe the challenge posed
by such effects as symmetry problems: understanding the cup as having any
single color requires a way of breaking the symmetry between its multiple
appearances.2 To know the cup’s color (e.g., to report this fact about the cup)
would require finding an acceptable, motivated breaker of the symmetry in
appearances.3
One putative symmetry breaker has proved tempting to a range of writers,
both philosophical and non-philosophical, who have appealed to natural
daylight to determine the colors of things.4 Granted, we’ll want to restrict
appeals to daylight to determining the colors of non-light emitting objects, be
they opaque, translucent, or transparent.5 But in that case, natural daylight
has proved to have wide appeal. In one refreshingly direct formulation of this
‘daylight maneuver,’ Allen (2010) writes that,
given the nature of natural daylight, and certain plausible assump-
tions about the nature of the colours it illuminates, there is indeed a
non-arbitrary reason to suppose that experiences of colour in natural
daylight present the real colours of objects (Allen 2010, p. 8; cf. Allen
2016, pp. 54-57).
1To say that there are such cases of perceptual variation with respect to color is not to say that
our visual systems fail to exhibit color constancy; it is, rather, to say that color constancy in human
visual systems is imperfect. For discussion of color constancy, its limitations, and the relation
between constancy and (well-attested) instances of perceptual variation, see Jameson and Hurvich
(1989), Hurlbert (1998), and Cohen (2012).
2There are ways of responding to the problem posed by perceptual variation, such as the
irrealism of Hardin (1988) and Boghossian and Velleman (1989), the relationalism of Cohen (2009),
or the relativism of Egan (2006) and Brogaard (2014), that deny that the cup has a single color, and
therefore do not face the symmetry problem we have raised. This paper addresses, specifically, the
use of the daylight manuever on behalf of those who accept that the cup has a single color, and for
whom, therefore, our symmetry problem is a prima facie challenge.
3Note that, to appreciate the force of this symmetry problem, one need not assume that all
viewing conditions are symmetric in this sense. Perhaps some illumination conditions—as it might
be, illumination solely by a monochromatic laser set to 430nm—can be ruled out on principled
and well-motivated grounds. The symmetry problem will nonetheless get off the ground if, as our
example is intended to suggest is likely, there remain a multiplicity of viewing conditions (with
psychophysically distinguishable effects) after one has carried out whatever motivated settings
aside one can.
4In philosophy, see Averill (1992, pp. 583-584); Johnston (1992, p. 248); Hyman (2006, pp. 34-
35). For more commonplace appeals to natural daylight, see Munsell Color Company (1976) and
Minnaert (1993), or any of the many discussions of ‘the dress’ circa 2015 (a quick Google search
and scroll through the comments section will reveal the widespread appeal of using the way that
objects look in natural daylight to determine their true colors).
5Of course, one should hope for this restriction to eventually be relaxed. Sadly, we don’t know
of anyone who has managed to extend the daylight manuever in this way. We’ll return to this issue
in §2.
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In this short note, we want to argue that, whatever else its merits, the
daylight maneuver is not a satisfactory answer to the problem posed by
perceptual variation. There are two main problems with the daylight maneuver.
First, despite its considerable intuitive appeal, it is essentially unmotivated.
Second, while the daylight maneuver targets one narrow aspect of color
variation—variation in color appearance under different sorts of illumination—
it cannot deal with a range of other well-known cases. In other words, the
daylight maneuver looks to be over-fitted to a particular sort of case, leaving
it in an unfavorable dialectical position vis-a-vis a range of more generally-
applicable alternatives.
1 Motivating daylight
The daylight maneuver ostensibly provides an answer to our initial question
about how to identify the cup’s color. It does this by singling out one
distinguished appearance from among the many variants as the one on the basis
of which we know the color of the cup, thereby breaking the symmetry with
which perception confronts us (but see §2). But is the answer it offers motivated?
After all, there are many other symmetry-breakings one could have chosen. So
why break the symmetry this way? Why think that this symmetry breaking is
the one we should employ in answering the initial question? Without some
justification, the daylight maneuver is a non-sequitur.
Below we consider several possible justifications, and argue that they are
unsatisfactory.
1.1 Daylight reveals colors
One possible attempt to justify the choice of daylight as symmetry-breaker
comes from the observation that daylight covers the whole visible spectrum
and is roughly equal in power across it, meaning that it gives us a good idea of
how an object reflects light across the entire visible spectrum. Thus, Allen (2010,
pp. 9-13) reasons that daylight is maximally revealing of an object’s surface
reflectance profile:
Even amongst illuminants that emit light in every part of the
visible spectrum, however, natural daylight is still the gold standard
because it satisfies the second condition of being (roughly speaking)
equal energy light: its spectral power distribution is (roughly) flat
across the visible spectrum (Allen 2010, p. 12; cf. Allen 2016, p. 54).
If one is sympathetic to the (controversial but popular) metaphysical view
that colors are identical with spectral reflectance profiles—defined by the
amount of incident light that the surface reflects at each wavelength in the
visible spectrum (Churchland 2009) or with equivalence classes of such spectral
reflectance profiles (Hilbert 1987; Byrne and Hilbert 1997a; Tye 2000)—then one
might think that this provides the needed justification for the choice of daylight
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as a symmetry breaker.6 For, if daylight illumination best reveals surface
spectral reflectance profiles, and colors are identical with surface spectral
reflectance profiles, then daylight puts viewers in the best epistemic position
available to apprehend by ordinary visual perception the colors of surfaces.
Unfortunately, considered as a justification of the daylight maneuver, the
answer now under consideration has three significant drawbacks.
First, it’s unclear why equal energy illumination should be thought more
revealing of surface reflectance profiles than alternatives. Given the light
striking visual receptors, one can derive an estimate of the surface reflectance
profile by dividing by any known illuminant (with non-zero intensity across the
visual range), whether its spectral power distribution is flat or not.
One might respond that daylight is nonetheless especially revealing of spec-
tral reflectance profiles because it is easier to know whether that illumination
prevails. But that’s surely not true for every kind of creature: there might be
visual systems capable of perceiving color but which are well-adapted to detect
color in conditions of unequal spectral power and ill-adapted to detect color in
conditions of equal power. Indeed, given the evolutionary pressures on human
beings to track colors in settings involving mottled light, our perceptual systems
are very plausibly of this sort. This is just the sort of evolutionary pressure that
has given rise to color constancy effects. Given all this, much more will need
to be said to motivate the claim that roughly equal spectral power distribution
best reveals the colors.
Second, the proposed justification we’re now considering is of much less
help for the version of the view on which colors are identified with classes
of reflectance profiles (rather than individual reflectance profiles). After all,
the facts about daylight illumination cited suggest that it can reveal, at best,
the particular spectral reflectance profile of the individual surface perceived.
Assuming that one knows, antecedently, to which class of reflectance profiles
that particular profile belongs, then of course one will be able to move from
this information to the color of that surface. In general, however, one shouldn’t
be assumed to know this, as the individual profiles within each class can differ
significantly from one another with respect to how they reflect light. What
this means is that daylight alone cannot reveal the colors of objects; rather, at
best, it reveals this only in conjunction with an understanding of the principles
involved in grouping together reflectance profiles into the sets which constitute
colors (for creatures like us).
The third problem for the justification offered is that it depends on a
controversial theoretical view whose invocation is possibly question-begging.
At least for many authors, the symmetry problems posed by perceptual
variation arises within the context of a debate about the correct metaphysics of
color. Within that dialectical context, a justification for the symmetry-breaking
on offer that helps itself to a specific metaphysical account of colors looks highly
problematic. After all, in a context in which we haven’t yet concluded that colors
6For what it is worth, most theorists interested in such views have favored the equivalence
class version because of the phenomenon of metamerism (i.e., the fact that spectral reflectances are
individuated more finely than are colors). For discussion, see Hilbert (1987, ch. 5).
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are identical to (classes of) spectral reflectance profiles, there’s no reason to think
of daylight illumination’s virtue of effectively revealing spectral reflectance
profiles as ipso facto providing access to objects’ colors.7
To put the point slightly differently, if defending the claim that daylight
reveals the true colors of things requires taking on the assumption that colors
are identical to surface reflectance profiles, then the defense of said claim
becomes far less interesting than one might have expected. For one might have
hoped that learning that daylight reveals the true colors of things would actually
help us to discern the correct metaphysics of color. If, instead, the argument
for that claim requires our assuming a particular metaphysics of color, then
the claim itself must be treated, dialectically, as a conditional one: if colors are
identical to surface reflectance profiles, then daylight reveals the true colors of
things. As we have noted above, we take there to be reasons to be skeptical of
even this conditional claim. Even if these worries can be dealt with, however,
we take this conditional claim to be far less interesting than one might have
expected; it is the presumed background metaphysics which appears to be
doing most of the heavy lifting.
1.2 Daylight reveals the supervenience base
Consider, then, a distinct answer to our request for justification based on the
more modest thesis that, whether or not colors are identical to surface spectral
reflectance profiles (or classes thereof), colors at least supervene on the latter. If
this thesis were true, one might hold that the condition of daylight illumination
nonetheless has a special epistemic advantage over other conditions in that it
positions viewers well to learn about the assumed supervenience base of the
surface colors they confront (Allen 2010, pp. 8-9, 2016, pp. 55-56).
Unfortunately, there are several reasons for dissatisfaction with this pro-
posed motivation as well.
First, it is far from obvious that perception under daylight illumination
is always sufficient to reveal the supervenience base of surface colors.8 One
problematic class of cases involves contrast colors, such as brown, olive green,
navy blue, or white—colors that surfaces manifest only when perceived in
7To see the force of this point, it may be helpful to consider once again our initial quandary of
how to identify the color of the cup, given its multiple appearances. Logical space makes room
for the following answers: (i) just one of the cup’s apparent colors is uniquely correct—as it might
be, the cup is silver, rather than blue or white; (ii) the cup truly bears all of the colors it appears
to have; (iii) the cup’s color changes depending on the lighting conditions; (iv) it bears no color
at all (though it appears colored). If one hasn’t already settled on answer (i) rather than (ii), (iii),
or (iv), then daylight’s capacity to reveal objects’ spectral reflectance profiles won’t justify one in
concluding that daylight reveals objects’ colors. And, indeed, as noted in the main text, even if
one accepts answer (i), this conclusion will still be unjustified without a further assumption that a
surface’s spectral reflectance profile is identical with (or at least correlated with) its color. This is
just to say that the purported symmetry-breaking advantage of daylight we are now considering
depends on assuming a view about the metaphysics of colors that is precisely under dispute in this
dialectical context.
8Because identity entails supervenience, this concern is also applicable to the stronger version
of the motivation discussed in §1.1.
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spatiotemporal proximity with surrounding items, through the operation of
contrast mechanisms (Hardin 1988, p. 70). Perceiving a surface that bears such
a contrast color under daylight but without the requisite surround may put one
in a position to apprehend the surface’s spectral reflectance profile; but it won’t
by itself reveal the supervenience base for the contrast color, which includes the
perception of numerically distinct items—and, moreover, different numerically
distinct items for different cases, since each of these contrast colors involves
contrast with distinct surrounds. A related concern involves colors, like
midnight blue, that are only fully appreciable under multiple illumination types.
Plausibly, part of what it is to be midnight blue is to appear blue in sunlight
but black under most artificial lights; in this, midnight blue’s reflectance profile
differs from that of either blue or black. But for us to recognize this difference,
we need to see the contrast between this color in different conditions; no single
viewing condition will do. Exactly the same is true of the colors of dichroic or
directionally reflective materials.
A second objection to the present proposal is that, once we forego the
identification of colors with (classes of) surface spectral reflectances, it’s no
longer clear why daylight’s alleged epistemic advantage (that of providing good
information about the supervenience base for colors) is a reason for thinking
variants produced in that condition are uniquely veridical. On the face of things,
the epistemic property of providing good information about the supervenience
base to creatures like us and the metaphysical property of generating perceptual
variants that are veridical to the exclusion of others are distinct. Assuming
these distinct properties must coincide would seem tantamount to accepting a
principle of sufficient reason that we have no reason to endorse.
1.3 Daylight reveals color content
A quite different possible answer to our request for justification involves a
different theoretical motivation, coming this time from psychosemantics.9
Suppose one held a version of the view that the content of a token perceptual
state is given by the subclass of causes of tokens of the same type that occurred
in the environment in which perceptual systems like ours evolved (Papineau
1987; Millikan 1989; Dretske 1995; Tye 1995, 2000; Neander 2017). And
suppose one additionally thought that the adaptively relevant environment for
perceptual systems like ours were one illuminated largely by daylight (given
the rarity of incandescent lighting in the Pleistocene). This would, if correct,
give one a reason for breaking the perceptual symmetry by favoring daylight-
produced variants: for, on these assumptions, daylight-produced variants are
veridical representations of the stimulus color, while other variants are not.
(Compare: if the only causes of HORSE tokens in the adaptively relevant
environment were horses, then contemporary horse caused HORSE tokens are
9Though we’re not aware of explicit invocations of this motivation in the literature, it seems
worthy of consideration given the failure of other options—especially for those impressed by the
ecological significance of daylight illumination.
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veridical, while contemporary cow-on-dark-night caused HORSE tokens are
not.)
Alas, this proposed answer seems unconvincing as well. For, crucially,
there’s no single illuminant that can be regarded as a necessary component
of the adaptively relevant environment for perceptual systems like ours. Pre-
sumably, outdoor illumination in the Pleistocene environment of evolutionary
adaptedness (mainly in arboreal/grassland areas in Africa and Eurasia (cf.
Stiner 2002; Sterelny 2012)) varied with the time of day, the weather, avail-
able shade, and proximity to reflective surfaces (etc.), just as it does today.
Consequently, considerations about the evolutionary past fail to install any
single illuminant as a unique symmetry-breaker, as required by the daylight
maneuver.
2 Further worries
So far we have argued that the daylight maneuver is unmotivated. But we
have a number of other concerns as well. Specifically, it strikes us that even
the most detailed versions of the thesis are substantially incomplete, and that
considerations of theoretical unity speak against our employing the maneuver.
The first of these worries parallels arguments that have been offered
elsewhere in the literature, typically in favor of one or another version of
pluralism about the colors of things. Because natural daylight is not a uniform
type of illumination, the mere, unsupplemented, appeal to daylight remains
seriously underspecified. For example, direct midday light is slightly more
powerful in relative terms around the yellow part of the visible spectrum,
whereas the light on a cloudy day will be more powerful around the blue
part. Likewise ‘skylight’, or indirect sunlight, is more powerful around the
blue part of the spectrum. Additionally, there are significant overall differences
in intensity between these two types of natural daylight. Predictably, the
differences in the spectral power distributions of such distinct phases of natural
daylight illumination can result in significant differences in the responses of
visual systems to ordinary objects. But this means that the appeal to daylight,
without further supplementation, fails to resolve the symmetry problem to
which it was offered as a response: there will remain cases in which a single
stimulus looks different to a normal observer in respect of its color as a function
of variations in illumination that remain within the range of natural daylight.
Allen (2010, pp. 13-14), for one, is aware of this point, and therefore
supplements his appeal to daylight with a more specific choice. Namely, he
proposes that the symmetry-breaking illuminant is in fact neither direct sunlight
nor skylight, but a combination of the two that, by canceling out peaks in one
with troughs in the other, offers perfectly smooth and flat power across the
visual spectrum (p. 16). Of course, nature doesn’t provide perfectly smooth and
flat illuminants, so Allen is prepared to advert to CIE illuminant standard D65
(a member of the ‘daylight’ series, representing a combination of direct sunlight
and skylight, and intended to roughly correspond to average midday light in
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Western and Northern Europe) as a good approximation to relative flatness in
spectral power distribution in ecologically realistic cases.10
This precisification of the daylight maneuver helpfully advances the discus-
sion: it answers the question ‘what do you mean by daylight?’ in a reasonably
determinate way, rules out alternatives, and so at least makes it possible to
invoke daylight as a way of breaking the symmetry between varying daylight
illuminants. But once again we should ask: why (i.e., for what motivated
reason) should we accept this precisification as a solution to our symmetry
problem? Surely not because it is especially or uniquely ecologically valid.
After all, and as we have already noted, naturally occurring illumination varies
with time of day, location, weather, available shade, and other parameters.
This explains why the CIE offers not one but a series of (otherwise much less
flat) D illuminants, corresponding to different types of daylight with different
correlated color temperatures (Judd et al. 1964). Spectrally flat illumination
(and, to a lesser extent, the D65 approximation thereto) is distinctive among
other natural illuminants (and their approximations in the D series) by its
computational and mathematical tractability, but not by its ecological realism
(certainly not everywhere and at all times). And we have already urged (§1) that
the distinctive mathematical features of flat illumination, taken by themselves,
do not add up to a reason to break the symmetry in its favor in cases of
perceptual variation.
It would seem, then, that the problem we are now pressing remains
unresolved. For we have seen that, without a more precise articulation of the
notion of daylight itself, the daylight maneuver does not solve the symmetry
problem it was enlisted to answer. However, as we have also seen, it is unclear
just how to spell out a notion of daylight in a more precise way that rules out
all psychophysically distinguishable alternatives (so that it will indeed resolve
the symmetry problem) and is independently motivated rather than stipulative.
As best we can tell, in fact, the more precise an articulation of the notion of
daylight one offers, the more likely it is that this articulation will amount to raw
stipulation.
But the troubles with the daylight maneuver don’t end there. A further class
of worries comes from the observation, also noted by Allen (2016, pp. 58-59,
65-66), that the daylight maneuver fails to resolve other structurally analogous
symmetry problems. For example, there are interspecies symmetry problems
deriving from variation in the mechanisms of color perception: because certain
animals (e.g. pigeons, bees) are capable of perceiving light in the ultraviolet
and infrared parts of the spectrum, their visual systems will respond to opaque
objects differently than will those of ordinary human observers. Again,
this instance of perceptual variation can be construed as an (interorganism)
symmetry problem: we have one object and different visual representations of
its color, and are in need of a principled method for breaking the symmetry one
10The artificiality of Allen’s officially preferred illuminant, which plays such a central role in his
view, sits uneasily with his characterization of his position as ‘naïve.’
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way rather than another (for regarding one of the representations veridical to
the exclusion of others).
Similarly, there are intraorganism symmetry problems arising from many
parameters of the viewing condition other than illumination: differences in the
viewing angle, the viewing distance, the state of adaptation of the perceiver,
what other objects seen simultaneously, grouping effects, etc. can all have
profound effects on the color that an object will appear to a single perceiver
(Hardin 1988; Cohen 2009). The daylight maneuver is plainly ill-suited to
break the relevantly analogous symmetries arising from any of these sorts of
perceptual variation.
Of course, defenders of the daylight maneuver are free to respond that these
symmetry problems should be handled in some other manner (cf. Allen 2016,
p. 50, 2010, pp. 3-4). Thus, for example, Allen responds to interspecies variation
cases by accepting a limited degree of pluralism about the colors: he accepts that
colors for pigeons will be distinct from colors for human beings (etc.), which
means that, on his view, natural daylight won’t actually reveal the true colors of
a thing, but only one among many of its true colors. But, while this combination
of views is coherent, it threatens to undermine further the attractions of the
daylight maneuver. For, in so far as pluralism or other non-daylight-involving
strategies for responding to perceptual variation succeed, it’s unclear why they
should not also be extended to deal with variation stemming from variation
in illumination conditions as well, thereby obviating the daylight maneuver
in favor of a more general solution to the problem. In other words, if another
more general response proves defensible, then considerations of theoretical
unity would seem to favor it over the daylight maneuver.
In all, then, the daylight maneuver looks to be both insufficient with
respect to the specific symmetry problem raised by variations in illumination
and clearly inapplicable to the many other symmetry problems confronting
perception.
3 Conclusion
We take the above to show that, despite its considerable intuitive appeal and
widespread invocation in real-world debates regarding the colors of things, a
convincing case for the daylight maneuver has yet to be made. Many of the
reasons for this are familiar, being the same sorts of reasons that have driven
many to more pluralist positions on the metaphysics of color. But some are new
and at least moderately surprising: prima facie, it seems almost absurd to doubt
the claim that daylight puts one in a superior epistemic position with regards
to seeing the colors of things. As we have been at pains to argue, however,
this should hardly be taken for granted. On the contrary, even if colors are
identical to surface reflectance profiles, our best epistemic position is going to
be determined by the function of our perceptual system—itself responsive to
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the conditions under which it evolved. As with the British monarchy, then, with
color perception it may prove best not to let daylight in upon the magic.11
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